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Abstract
In this work, we extend the topology-based approach for characterizing computability in
asynchronous crash-failure distributed systems to asynchronous Byzantine systems. We give the
first theorem with necessary and sufficient conditions to solve arbitrary tasks in asynchronous
Byzantine systems where an adversary chooses faulty processes. In our adversary formulation,
outputs of non-faulty processes are constrained in terms of inputs of non-faulty processes only.
For colorless tasks, an important subclass of distributed problems, the general result reduces
to an elegant model that effectively captures the relation between the number of processes, the
number of failures, as well as the topological structure of the task’s simplicial complexes.
1 Introduction
A task is a distributed coordination problem involving multiple computing processes. Each pro-
cess starts with a private input, taken from a finite set, communicates with other processes, and
eventually decides on a private output, also taken from a finite set. One of the central questions in
distributed computing is characterizing which tasks can be solved in which models of computation.
Those models specify synchrony, communication, and failure characteristics/guarantees. A protocol
is a distributed algorithm that solves a task given a model of computation.
In this work, we consider asynchronous systems, where processes have different relative speeds,
and communication is subject to unbound, yet finite delays. We are interested in situations where a
subset of faulty processes can exist. Two failure models are often discussed in the literature. In well-
studied crash-failure models [19], faulty processes simply halt without warning, at possibly different
times. In the more severe Byzantine-failure models [18], faulty processes can behave arbitrarily,
even maliciously. Here, we address the problem of characterizing which tasks are solvable in asyn-
chronous Byzantine systems. Even though necessary and sufficient conditions for computability in
∗Supported by NSF 000830491.
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crash-failure systems have long been known [15], this work provides the first general computability
characterization for asynchronous Byzantine systems.
1.1 Our Contributions
Tools adapted from combinatorial topology have been successful in characterizing task solvability in
synchronous and asynchronous crash-failure systems, as in [15]. This paper extends the approach
to tasks in asynchronous Byzantine systems [18, 19]. The results presented here suggest that the
language of combinatorial topology (a generalization of the language of graphs) is a convenient
and effective way to formalize a range of distinct distributed computing models. We present some
background on distributed computing in Sec. 2, and outline its topology-based modeling in Sec. 3.
Our principal contribution, presented in Sec 4, is to give the first theorem with necessary and
sufficient conditions to solve arbitrary tasks in asynchronous Byzantine systems. In our approach,
a Byzantine-failure task is defined in terms of a pair of combinatorial structures called simplicial
complexes [22, 17], and a map modeling task semantics. We assume an adversary that may deem
a subset of processes as faulty, and require that the output of non-faulty processes is permitted in
light of the input of non-faulty processes, according to the task’s formal specification. Our theorem
says that, in asynchronous systems, a Byzantine-failure task is solvable if and only if a dual crash-
failure task, also expressed in terms of simplicial complexes, is solvable. Given that solvability
conditions have long been known for crash failures (see [15]), our equivalence theorem, presented
in Sec. 4, provides for the first time solvability conditions for Byzantine failures in asynchronous
systems.
Furthermore, the above characterization reduces to a particularly elegant, compact form for
colorless tasks [3, 13], an important subclass of tasks that encompasses well-studied problems such
as consensus [9], k-set agreement [6], and approximate agreement [8, 21]. For those tasks, we
provide additional results in Sec. 5 capturing the relation between the number of processes, the
number of failures, and the topological structure of the task’s simplicial complexes.
1.2 Related Work
The Byzantine failure model was initially introduced by Lamport, Shostak, and Pease in [18].
Most of the literature in this area has focused on the synchronous model (survey in [10]), not
on the (more demanding) asynchronous model considered here. The reliable broadcast protocol
is adapted from Bracha [4] and from Srikanth and Toueg [24]. Malkhi et al. [20] propose several
computational models in which processes communicate via shared objects (instead of messages),
and display Byzantine failures. De Prisco et al. [7] consider the k-set agreement problem in a
variety of asynchronous settings. Their notion of the validity condition for the k-set agreement
problem, however, is weaker than ours. Neiger [23] discusses a stronger validity condition similar
to the constraints used here.
2
2 Operational Model
We have n+ 1 processes1 P0, . . . , Pn, that exchange messages via pairwise distinct channels. These
channels form a complete graph, and are reliable and FIFO : all transmitted messages are eventually
delivered, in the order they were sent. Communication is asynchronous: the delivery of any message
happens after a finite, yet unbounded delay. Given that the channels are pairwise distinct, the
sender of any message is reliably identified (authenticated channels in the literature [5]). The
processes are asynchronous as well, with unbound relative speed.
Up to t processes might be faulty. We discuss two classical models for process failures. In
the crash-failure model [19], processes execute the protocol as prescribed, yet the faulty processes
become permanently silent at any point in the execution (i.e., halt and never send additional
messages). In the Byzantine-failure model [18], faulty processes display arbitrary, even malicious
behavior, which includes collusion to prevent the protocol to terminate correctly. In a crash-failure
system, the faulty processes are precisely the ones that halt during the execution. In our Byzantine-
failure system, however, the faulty processes are a set of no more than t processes chosen by an
adversary. Byzantine processes may execute the protocol correctly or incorrectly, at the discretion
of the adversary. Regarding notation, the set of all processes is denoted by P, partitioned in
non-faulty processes G ⊆ P and faulty processes G¯ = P \G.
We model processes as state machines. Each process Pi has an internal state, or view, written
view(Pi). Initially, view(Pi) is the process’ starting input. In this work, we are interested in task
solvability, but not in communication complexity (i.e., number and size of messages). Hence, we
assume that processes follow a full-information protocol [14]. Each process repeatedly: (1) receives
the state information from other processes; (2) concatenates that information to its own internal
state; (3) sends its internal state to all other processes. After completing some number of iterations,
each process applies a decision function δ to its current state in order to decide.
As a first measure in this work, we use higher-level communication abstractions on top of the
bare message-passing model. These new abstractions are described below.
2.1 Reliable Broadcast
Reliable broadcast is a well-known technique that forces Byzantine processes to communicate con-
sistently with other processes [4, 24, 2, 5]. The communication is organized in asynchronous rounds,
where a round may involve several message exchanges. Messages have the form (P, r, c), where P is
the sending process, r is the current round, and c is the actual content. Messages not conforming to
this structure can safely be discarded. The technique, which works as long as n+1 > 3t, guarantees
the following:
Non-Faulty Integrity: If a non-faulty P never reliably broadcasts (P, r, c), then no non-faulty
process ever reliably receives (P, r, c).
Non-Faulty Liveness: If a non-faulty P reliably broadcasts (P, r, c), then all non-faulty processes
will reliably receive (P, r, c) eventually.
Global Uniqueness: If two non-faulty processes Q and R reliably receive, respectively, (P, r, c)
and (P, r, c′), then the messages are equal (c = c′), even if the sender P is Byzantine.
1 Choosing n + 1 processes rather than n simplifies the topological notation, but also slightly complicates the
computing notation. Choosing n processes has the opposite trade-off. We choose n + 1 for compatibility with prior
work.
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Global Liveness: For two non-faulty processes Q and R, if Q reliably receives (P, r, c), then R
will reliably receive (P, r, c) eventually, even if the sender P is Byzantine.
We overview the algorithms in Appendix A. For details, please refer to [2, 5, 4].
In this text, P.RBSend(M) denotes the reliable broadcast of message M by process P , and
P.RBRecv(M) the reliable receipt of M by P . Unless otherwise noted, all messages exchanged in
asynchronous Byzantine systems use reliable broadcast.
3 Topological Model
We now overview some important notions from combinatorial topology, and describe how they
model concurrent computation. For details, please refer to Munkres [22] or Kozlov [17].
3.1 Combinatorial Tools
A simplicial complex K consists of a finite set V along with a collection of subsets of V closed
under containment. An element of V is called a vertex of K. Each set in K is called a simplex,
usually denoted by lower-case Greek letters: σ, τ , etc. A subset of a simplex is called a face. The
dimension dim(σ) of a simplex σ is |σ| − 1. We use “k-simplex” as shorthand for “k-dimensional
simplex”, also in “k-face”. The dimension dim(K) of a complex is the maximal dimension of its
simplices. The set of vertices of K is denoted by V (K). The set of simplices of K having dimension
at most ` is a subcomplex of K, which is called `-skeleton of K, denoted by skel`(K).
Let K and L be complexes. A vertex map f carries vertices of K to vertices of L. If f additionally
carries simplices of K to simplices of L, it is called a simplicial map. A carrier map Φ from K
to L takes each simplex σ ∈ K to a subcomplex Φ(σ) ⊆ L, such that for all σ, τ ∈ K, we have
Φ(σ ∩ τ) ⊆ Φ(σ) ∩ Φ(τ). A simplicial map φ : K → L is carried by the carrier map Φ : K → 2L if,
for every simplex σ ∈ K, we have φ(σ) ⊆ Φ(σ).
Although we defined simplices and complexes in a purely combinatorial way, they can also be
interpreted geometrically. An n-simplex can be identified with the convex hull of (n+ 1) affinely-
independent points in the Euclidean space of appropriate dimension. This geometric realization
can be extended to complexes. The point-set that underlies such geometric complex K is called the
polyhedron of K, denoted by |K|.
We can define simplicial and carrier maps between geometrical complexes. Given a simplicial
map φ : K → L (resp. carrier map Φ : K → 2L), the polyhedrons of every simplex in K and L
induce a continuous simplicial map φc : |K| → |L| (resp. continuous carrier map Φc : |K| → |2L|).
We say that φ (resp. φc) is carried by Φ if, for every simplex σ ∈ K, we have |φ(σ)| ⊆ |Φ(σ)| (resp.
φc(|σ|) ⊆ Φc(|σ|)).
3.2 Tasks in the Crash Failure Model
We now present the formalization of crash-failure tasks as in [11]. In this work, the input value
(resp. output value) of process Pi will always be denoted by Ii (resp. Oi).
Definition 3.1. A name-labeled simplex σ is a simplex where:
1. for any vertex v ∈ σ we have v = (Pi, Vi) with Pi ∈ P;
2. if (Pi, Vi) ∈ σ and (Pj , Vj) ∈ σ then Pi 6= Pj .
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Definition 3.2. For any name-labeled simplex σ,
names(σ) = {Pi : ∃V such that (Pi, V ) ∈ σ},
views(σ) = {Vi : ∃P such that (P, Vi) ∈ σ}.
Definition 3.3. For any simplicial complex K,
names(K) =
⋃
σ∈K
names(σ) and views(K) =
⋃
σ∈K
views(σ).
Definition 3.4. A canonical simplex σ is a simplex with dim(σ) ≥ n− t.
Definition 3.5. Two simplices σ1 and σ2 match if
names(σ1) = names(σ2).
Definition 3.6. A carrier map Φ : K → 2L is name-preserving if, for any σ ∈ K, also including
vertices of K, names(σ) = names(Φ(σ)).
For any crash-failure task T , an initial configuration for T is σI = {(Pi, Ii) : Ii is input by Pi},
a canonical name-labeled simplex describing a permitted input to T . A final configuration for T
is σO = {(Pi, Oi) : Oi is output by Pi}, a canonical name-labeled simplex describing a permitted
output of T . Any initial or final configuration is a canonical simplex because at least (n + 1) − t
non-faulty processes start and finish every computation of T .
Definition 3.7. A crash-failure task specification is formally a triple T = (I,O,∆) such that:
• I is the input complex. A simplex σ ∈ I if there is some σI ⊇ σ that is an initial configuration,
with dim(σI) = n.
• O is the output complex. A simplex σ ∈ O if there is some σO ⊇ σ that is a final configuration,
with dim(σO) ≥ n− t.
• ∆ : I → 2O is a name-preserving carrier map. The simplex τ ∈ ∆(σ) if the final configuration
τ is valid given the initial configuration σ, with σ matching τ . Also, ∆(σ′) = ∅ for any non-
canonical simplex σ′ of I.
If an initial configuration σ has ∆(σ) = ∅, that is, having no associated final configuration, it
effectively precludes any protocol. Therefore, tasks are usually defined such that ∆(σ) 6= ∅ for any
initial configuration σ.
3.3 Tasks in the Byzantine Failure Model
In Byzantine-failure tasks, we only care about the relation between inputs and outputs of the non-
faulty processes. The task’s outputs should be consistent, despite the participation (sometimes
even correct) of the Byzantine processes, a property sometimes called strong validity, as in [23]. We
consider an adversarial model in which any set of up to t processes may be chosen as faulty, with
those processes displaying arbitrary behavior. Regardless of which processes are faulty, any final
configuration of the non-faulty processes must be permitted in respect to the initial configuration of
the non-faulty processes. For that goal, our task specification T = (I,O,∆) constrains the behavior
of non-faulty processes only.
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Consider a Byzantine-failure task, say T . A non-faulty initial configuration for T is a canonical
name-labeled simplex σI = {(Pi, Ii) with Pi ∈ G}, capturing the attribution of inputs to non-faulty
processes. Additionally, a non-faulty final configuration for T is a canonical name-labeled simplex
σO = {(Pi, Oi) with Pi ∈ G} capturing the attribution of outputs to non-faulty processes.
Importantly, in our adversarial context, any set of no more than t processes may be deemed as
faulty. This adversarial power implies the following property:
Property 3.8. If σ is a non-faulty initial configuration:
1. There exists a simplex σn ⊇ σ with dim(σn) = n where σn is a non-faulty initial configuration;
2. For all σ′ ⊆ σ with dim(σ′) ≥ n− t, we have that σ′ is a non-faulty initial configuration.
The formal task definition for Byzantine tasks practically mirrors the definition for crash-failure
tasks, although it only constrains task semantics for non-faulty processes:
Definition 3.9. A Byzantine-failure task specification is formally a triple T = (I,O,∆) such that:
• I is the input complex. A simplex σ ∈ I if there is some σI ⊇ σ that is a non-faulty initial
configuration, with dim(σI) = n.
• O is the output complex. A simplex σ ∈ O if there is some σO ⊇ σ that is a non-faulty final
configuration, with dim(σO) ≥ n− t.
• ∆ : I → 2O is a name-preserving carrier map. The simplex τ ∈ ∆(σ) if the non-faulty final
configuration τ is valid given the non-faulty initial configuration σ, with σ matching τ . Also
∆(σ′) = ∅ for any non-canonical simplex σ′ of I.
The map ∆ could in principle be other than a carrier map. However, for the sake of studying
task computability, it is enough to assume ∆ as being a carrier map. Consider the following
scenario, where ∆(σ1 ∩ σ2) 6⊆ ∆(σ1) ∩ ∆(σ2), for σ1, σ2 ∈ I. Also consider an asynchronous
protocol, with names(σ1 ∩ σ2) representing all non-faulty processes, and names(σ1 \ σ2) as well
as names(σ2 \ σ1) representing faulty processes. Now, the adversary can suitably delay the faulty
processes so that non-faulty processes cannot discern if the non-faulty initial configuration was σ1,
σ2, or (σ1 ∩ σ2). Since we assumed an asynchronous protocol, a decision must be made, and it
should be inside ∆(σ1 ∩ σ2) in order to cover all possibilities.
With that in mind, take a Byzantine task T1 = (I,O,∆), with ∆ being an arbitrary map, and
another task T2 = (I,O,∆′), identical to T1 except that ∆′ ⊆ ∆ is a carrier map: ∆′(σ1 ∩ σ2) ⊆
∆′(σ1) ∩ ∆′(σ2) for any σ1, σ2 ∈ I. As we have seen, the unrestricted task T1 is solvable only if
its constrained task T2 is solvable. In addition, if the constrained task is solvable, then clearly the
unconstrained task is solvable. Therefore, for the sake of studying task solvability, the map in the
Byzantine task definition is simply a carrier map.
3.4 Pseudospheres
Informally, a pseudosphere is a simplicial complex formed by assigning values to processes inde-
pendently, such that a process Pi receives only values from a set Si. In many problems, input and
output complexes are pseudospheres or unions of pseudospheres.
Formally, a pseudosphere is denoted by K = Ψ(Σ,S), where S ⊆ P represents the processes
to which we attribute values, and Σ = {non-name-labeled σi for each Pi ∈ S} defines such values.
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Vertices of σi are independently assigned to the corresponding process Pi. A name-labeled simplex
σ ∈ Ψ(Σ, S) if σ = {(Pi, vi) : Pi ∈ S and vi ∈ σi ∈ Σ}. When σi = σj = σ for all i 6= j, we call the
resulting pseudosphere a simple pseudosphere, written as Ψ(σ;S).
4 The Equivalence Theorem
In this section, we will present our main theorem. We show that, in asynchronous t-resilient
systems, a task Tb = (I,O,∆) is solvable in the Byzantine failure model if and only if its dual task
Tc = (I˜, O˜, ∆˜) is solvable in the crash failure model, with I˜, O˜, and ∆˜ suitably and respectively
defined in terms of I, O, and ∆. We call the task Tb the Byzantine counterpart of Tc.
The use of reliable broadcast avoids the problem where Byzantine processes deliberately send
conflicting information to different processes. However, Byzantine processes can still introduce a
false input and execute the protocol correctly, yet selectively delaying or omitting certain mes-
sages. Each non-faulty process must choose a correct output even though a Byzantine process is
indistinguishable from a non-faulty process having an authentic input. If the input complex is not
a simple pseudosphere, two or more Byzantine processes can introduce incompatible inputs, and
each non-faulty process must decide correctly, without necessarily detecting which, if any, of the
incompatible inputs was indeed authentic. Our dual crash-failure task must be able to capture such
issues.
4.1 Defining the Dual Task
We now formally define the dual task Tc = (I˜, O˜, ∆˜) in terms of the Byzantine task Tb = (I,O,∆).
Definition 4.1. An initial configuration of Tc is a name-labeled simplex σI ∈ I˜ such that it contains
a canonical name-labeled simplex σG ∈ I, with views(σI) ⊆ views(I).
Definition 4.2. A final configuration of Tc is a name-labeled simplex τO ∈ O˜ such that it contains
a canonical name-labeled simplex τG ∈ O, with views(τO) ⊆ views(O).
Definition 4.3. Given a Byzantine task Tb = (I,O,∆), its dual crash-failure task Tc = (I˜, O˜, ∆˜) is
such that:
• I˜ is the input complex. A simplex σ ∈ I˜ if there is some σI ⊇ σ that is a possible initial
configuration of Tc, with dim(σI) = n.
• O˜ is the output complex. A simplex σ ∈ O˜ if there is some σO ⊇ σ that is a possible final
configuration of Tc, with dim(σO) ≥ n− t.
• ∆˜ : I˜ → 2O˜ is a name-preserving carrier map, defined below.
Particularly, if I (respectively O) is a simple pseudosphere with dimension n, then I˜ = I
(respectively O = O˜).
Definition 4.4. The map ∆˜ is a name-preserving carrier map where:
∆˜(σ) = {τ ∈ O˜ : ∀ canonical σ′ ⊆ σ with σ′ ∈ I,
∃ matching τ ′ ⊆ τ with τ ′ ∈ O and τ ′ ∈ ∆(σ′)}, (1)
or ∅ if σ is not a canonical simplex in I˜. Intuitively, the map ∆˜ satisfies the original Byzantine
specification for any possible choice of non-faulty processes.
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The map ∆˜ is defined as a carrier map, so
∆˜(σ1 ∩ σ2) ⊆ ∆˜(σ1) ∩ ∆˜(σ2)
for any σ1, σ2 ∈ I˜. Also, ∆˜(σ′) = ∅ for any non-canonical simplex σ′ of I˜, satisfying the final
constraint on ∆˜ imposed by crash-failure tasks.
4.2 Solvability Correspondence
Given an algorithm for Tc, we construct an algorithm for Tb, showing that, in asynchronous, t-
resilient systems, if we solve the crash-failure Tc = (I˜, O˜, ∆˜) then we also solve its Byzantine
counterpart Tb = (I,O,∆)
For that purpose, each non-faulty process Pi will maintain a table Ti. The table has one entry
for each combination of process and round: for process p ∈ P and round r ≥ 1, the contents of the
corresponding entry at Ti is denoted as Ti(p, r). An unfilled entry has contents ⊥.
In the first round, non-faulty processes exchange values in views(I). For any non-faulty pro-
cesses Pi ∈ G and Pj ∈ P, the entry for Ti(Pj , 1) contains (Pj , v) only if (Pj , v) ∈ V (I). Note that
Ti(Pi, 1) = (Pi, Ii), representing the process’ own input (Lines 2-3). For any process set S, Ti(S, r)
is the set containing Ti(p, r) iff p ∈ S.
Definition 4.5. A starting process set S ⊂ P for Pi ∈ G is a set where the simplex σ = {e : e ∈
Ti(S, 1)} is an initial configuration of Tc.
In subsequent rounds, non-faulty processes exchange sets of size at least (n+ 1)− t. Such sets
satisfy some requirements at the (non-faulty) sender, before being transmitted, and at the (non-
faulty) receiver, before being accepted. More specifically, consider Pi ∈ G. The entry for Ti(Pi, r) is
set to (Pi, V ) as soon as the predicate Vali(Pi, r, V ) becomes true. Then, the corresponding message
for Ti(Pi, r), namely (Pi, r, V ), is sent (Lines 6-7). Moreover, if some Pj ∈ P sends (Pj , r, V ), as soon
as the message reaches Pi and the predicate Vali(Pj , r, V ) becomes true, the message is accepted
by Pi. Then, the corresponding entry for (Pj , r, V ), namely Ti(Pj , r), is set to (Pj , V ) (Lines 9-10).
Definition 4.6. The predicate Vali(p, r, V ) evaluates to true only if :
1. If r = 1, then (p, V ) ∈ V (I);
2. If r > 1, then
(a) |V | ≥ (n+ 1)− t;
(b) Ti(p, r − 1) ∈ V ;
(c) V ⊆ Ti(S, r − 1), for some starting process set S for Pi.
In Algorithm 1, we present the protocol solving Tb, as run by non-faulty processes. The param-
eter Ii is Pi’s input, and P is a crash-failure protocol for Tc, which is identical across non-faulty
processes. The loop at Line 4 runs until a particular set, an Ri-consistent process set Ci, is found.
The definition follows below.
Definition 4.7. An R-consistent process set S ⊆ P for Pi ∈ G is one where
1. S is a starting process set;
2. Ti(p, r) 6= ⊥ for all p ∈ S and 1 ≤ r ≤ R;
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3. Pi ∈ S.
By definition, for any R-consistent process set S, we have that σ = {e : e ∈ Ti(S, 1)} is an
initial configuration of Tc, with |S| ≥ (n+ 1)− t and all messages accepted and validated up to the
asynchronous round R. A decidable R-consistent process set S is one where P, if simulated only
with entries of Ti(S, 1 . . . R) = {Ti(S, r) : 1 ≤ r ≤ R}, returns an output.
Algorithm 1 Pi.ConstrainedExecution(Ii,P)
1: By default Ti(p, r)← ⊥ for all p ∈ P and r ≥ 1
2: Ti(Pi, 1)← (Pi, Ii)
3: RBSend((Pi, 1, Ii))
4: while 6 ∃ decidable Ri-consistent process set Ci do
5: upon First V with Vali(Pi, r, V ) and r > 1 do
6: Ti(Pi, r)← (Pi, V )
7: RBSend((Pi, r, V ))
8:
9: upon RBRecv((Pj , r, V )) with Vali(Pj , r, V ) do
10: Ti(Pj , r)← (Pj , V )
11:
12: simulate P using only entries of Ti(Ci, 1 . . . R)
13: return own decision value from the above execution
We also assume that non-faulty processes keep processing messages as in Lines 5 to 10 even
after exiting the loop of Line 4. This can be seen as a kind of background service interleaved with
the steps of the protocol, similar to [1]2.
Lemma 4.8. If some Pi ∈ G fills Ti(p, r) with (p, V ), then any other Pj ∈ G eventually fills Tj(p, r)
with (p, V ).
Proof. By induction on r. Base: r = 1. If Pi fills Ti(p, 1) with (p, V ), then Vali(p, 1, V ) is
true, implying that (p, v) ∈ V (I), by (1) in Definition 4.6. By the liveness properties of the
reliable broadcast, the corresponding message (p, 1, V ) eventually reaches any other Pj ∈ G, and
Valj(p, 1, V ) will be true for identical reason, filling Tj(p, 1) with (p, V ).
IH: Assume that for all r′ < r, if some Pi ∈ G fills Ti(p, r′) with (p, V ), then any other
Pj ∈ G eventually fills Tj(p, r′) with (p, V ). If Pi fills Ti(p, r) with (p, V ), then Vali(p, r, V ) is
true. Hence, Pi filled all entries Ti(S, r − 1), considering S as the set in (2)-(c) on Definition 4.6.
By the induction hypothesis, all those entries are eventually filled in any other Pj ∈ G, which
eventually makes Valj(p, r, V ) to be true. By the liveness properties of the reliable broadcast, the
corresponding message (p, r, V ) eventually reaches Pj , filling Tj(p, r) with (p, V ).
The entries in the tables on non-faulty processes represent an asynchronous, t-resilient, crash-
failure execution schedule for P. Crash failure processes execute the full-information protocol
described in Sec. 2. For any asynchronous round r > 0, we interpret Ti(Pj , r) = (Pj , V ), as the
scenario where Pj ∈ P broadcasts (Pj , r, V ) and Pi ∈ G receives (Pj , r, V ). By the previous lemma,
2 To make sure these extra messages are compatible with P, as soon as Pi ∈ G reaches Line 12, its (Ri + 1)-th
round message contains only entries Ti(Ci, Ri), “announcing” the decision. The execution of P could then ignore
Pi’s messages accordingly.
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if a message is received by some non-faulty process, it is eventually received by any other non-faulty
process. Moreover, by the validation predicate, Ti(Pj , r) 6= ⊥ implies in Ti(Pj , r − 1) 6= ⊥ for all
r > 1. An empty entry in Ti represents the inherent inability of a crash-failure processes Pi to
discern between a failed process and a sender whose message is delayed.
Lemma 4.9. Any non-faulty process Pi ∈ G eventually reaches Line 12, and its simulation returns
an output.
Proof. We show that G is bound to be recognized as an r-consistent process set at Pi for any r ≥ 1.
Base: r = 1. Non-faulty processes execute the protocol correctly, so, by the previous lemma,
Ti(G, 1) is eventually filled. IH: Now assume that Ti(G, r − 1) is totally filled. Fix some Pi ∈ G.
By the previous lemma, all non-faulty process Pj ∈ G eventually have Valj(Pj , r, Tj(G, r − 1)) as
true, sending a message (Pj , r, V ) for some V , although not necessarily with V = Tj(G, r − 1).
All those messages are eventually delivered and accepted by Pi, again by the previous lemma,
and Ti(G, r) is eventually filled. We conclude that G is bound to be recognized as an r-consistent
process set at Pi.
If Pi considers solely the entries of an r-consistent process set to simulate an execution of P,
we actually denote a valid t-resilient, asynchronous, crash-failure schedule for P. This simulates
an initial configuration of Tc, under the perspective of Pi, up to the asynchronous round r. Hence,
there exists a concrete Ri > 0 such that Pi reaches Line 12 with some decidable Ri-consistent
process set Ci, although not necessarily Ci = G, with P returning an output.
Lemma 4.10. If an asynchronous, t-resilient crash-failure protocol P solves Tc = (I˜, O˜, ∆˜), then
Algorithm 1 solves its Byzantine counterpart Tb = (I,O,∆).
Proof. Take some Pi ∈ G, calling Ri = r. We say that p1 ∈ P is seen by Pi on its execution of P
at Line 12 if there is a sequence p1 . . . pr such that (p`, V`) in Ti(p`+1, `+ 1) for all 1 ≤ ` < r, and
pr ∈ Ci. Let σi = {Ti(p, 1) : p is seen byPi} be the input observed by Pi on its execution of P at
Line 12.
A Byzantine process Pb such that (Pb, v) ∈ σi for some Pi ∈ G is said to have apparent input v.
As all messages are validated through the validation predicate, we have that v ∈ V (I), in light of
(2)-(1) in Definition 4.6.
The non-faulty inputs define σG ∈ I, and the non-faulty plus apparent inputs define
σA =
⋃
Pp∈G
σi.
The input observed by Pi, σi, is an initial configuration of I˜ including Pi, by Definitions 4.7
and 4.5. Therefore, the simulation of P at Line 12 produces an output in ∆˜(σi) 6= ∅ for all Pi ∈ G.
In addition, σG ⊆ σA, by definition of σA, and apparent inputs are in V (I), as discussed before.
Then, σA is an initial configuration of Tc as well, and ∆˜(σA) 6= ∅.
By the previous lemma, recalling our assumption that P is a crash-failure protocol for Tc, any
non-faulty process Pi ∈ G will reach Line 12, producing an output Oi such that
(Pi, Oi) ∈ τi ⊆ τ , (2)
with τi ∈ ∆˜(σi) and τ ∈ ∆˜(σA).
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Since simulations in Line 12 run considering partial views of a global asynchronous, t-resilient,
crash-failure schedule for P, decisions are consistent among non-faulty processes (or we contradict
the fact that P solves Tc in asynchronous, t-resilient, crash-failure systems). In other words, we
have that (Pj , Oj) ∈ τj ⊆ τ , with τj ∈ ∆˜(σj) and with the same τ as in (2), above. In other words,
τG = {(Pi, Oi) : Pi ∈ G} ⊆ τ ∈ ∆˜(σA),
with τG ∈ ∆(σG), by definition of ∆˜. As the choice of non-faulty process is totally arbitrary, the
protocol solves Tb.
Theorem 4.11. In asynchronous, t-resilient systems, the task Tb = (I,O,∆) is solvable in the
Byzantine failure model if and only if the task Tc = (I˜, O˜, ∆˜) is solvable in the crash failure model.
Proof. Tb implies Tc. Consider an execution of Tb where Byzantine processes may only fail by
crashing, having inputs in views(I). Non-faulty and apparent inputs, those pertaining to Byzantine
processes, define σ ∈ I˜.
At least one canonical simplex having values in I exists by definition of I˜. Given a protocol
for Tb, for any canonical simplex σ′ ⊆ σ with σ′ ∈ I, effectively representing non-faulty processes,
their outputs τ ′ are such that τ ′ ∈ ∆(σ′), in order to satisfy any adversarial definition of non-faulty
processes. Of course, τ ′ matches σ′, and the protocol is actually computing ∆˜. The implication
follows because any Byzantine protocol is also a crash protocol.
Tc implies Tb. Follows from Lemma 4.10.
In the following section, we present applications of our Equivalence Theorem in the context of
colorless tasks. We particularly remark one important consequence: for certain colorless tasks, we
will have a lower bound on the number of processes in order to allow these tasks to be solvable.
This number, furthermore, is expressed in terms of the number of failures and the task’s simplicial
complexes.
5 Colorless Tasks
Colorless tasks [13, 3] consist of an important class of problems where tasks are totally defined in
terms of the input and output sets of values, not the particular attribution of values to processes.
In this section, a specific application of the topological tools yields novel and elegant computability
results for colorless tasks.
A classical example of colorless task is k-set agreement [6]. Say that processes start with input
values from a finite set V . In crash-failure systems, informally speaking, a protocol solves k-set
agreement if outputs satisfy: (1) Agreement – no more than k different outputs exist; and (2)
Validity – any output was proposed in the input. In Byzantine systems, a natural variation, called
strict k-set agreement, requires that processes decide on values proposed by non-faulty processes
only (as in [23], for consensus).
Task specifications can be simplified and specialized for colorless tasks. We are then able to
express computability results in a more elegant language.
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5.1 Model
For colorless tasks, input and output simplices represent sets of input and output values permitted
in the initial/final configurations. Such sets are closed under inclusion, that is, if S represents a
valid initial (resp. final) input (resp. output) set, so is any S′ ⊆ S. The admissible sets of output
values depend solely on the set of input values taken by processes. Importantly, for any set of
values, any particular attribution of those values to processes is valid.
In light of these properties, we give simpler task specification for colorless tasks. Initially, we
consider crash failures, following the model in [12]. The Byzantine specification will essentially
mirror the approach of Sec. 3.3.
A colorless task is a triple (I∗,O∗,∆∗), where I∗ is the colorless input complex, O∗ is the
colorless output complex, and ∆∗ : I∗ → 2O∗ is the colorless carrier map. Each vertex in I∗ (resp.
O∗) is a possible input (resp. output) value, and each simplex is a possible initial input (resp.
output) set. Given an initial input set, ∆∗ specifies which final output sets are legal. Colorless
tasks can of course be expressed in the general model (I,O,∆), as seen in [12]:
σ∗ ∈ I∗ (resp. O∗) ⇔ Ψ(σ∗;P) ⊆ I (resp. O) (3)
τ ∈ ∆(σ)⇔ views(τ) ∈ ∆∗(views(σ)) (4)
For instance, for the (t+ 1)-set agreement, the map ∆∗ is the skeleton operator skelt as output
values must be chosen among at most t+ 1 different values.
With Byzantine tasks, I∗ (resp. O∗) refers to non-faulty input (resp. output) sets only. Since
the adversary may choose any set with up to t processes as Byzantine (including the empty set),
the following relation remains valid: σ∗ ∈ I∗ (resp. O∗) if and only if Ψ(σ∗;P) ⊆ I (resp. O).
The map ∆∗ is defined as in Equation 4, which now conditions non-faulty output sets to non-faulty
input sets only.
Before proceeding with computability results specific to colorless tasks, we define some addi-
tional topological tools.
5.2 Simplicial Approximations
Recall that simplicial complexes can be viewed under a combinatorial or a geometrical perspective.
Combinatorially speaking, for any simplex σ, the boundary of σ, denoted ∂ σ, is the simplicial
complex of (dim(σ) − 1)-faces of σ. Geometrically speaking, the interior of σ is formally defined
as Intσ = |σ| \ | ∂ σ|. The open star of σ ∈ A, denoted Ostσ, is the union of the interiors of all
simplices in A containing σ. See Fig. 1.
A
v
Intσ∂ σ
Thursday, May 9, 13
Figure 1: The interior and boundary of a 2-simplex σ, and the open star of a 0-simplex {v} ⊆ A.
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A subdivision of a complex A is a complex B such that: (i) for any τ ∈ B, |τ | is contained in the
polyhedron of some σ ∈ A. (ii) for any σ ∈ A, |σ| is the union of disjoint polyhedrons of simplices
belonging to B. We understand the subdivision as an operator Div from complexes to complexes.
If we perform N consecutive applications of Div, the composite operator is denoted by DivN .
A mesh-shrinking subdivision DivA of a complex A is a subdivision where, for any 1-simplex
σ ∈ skel1(A), Div σ contains at least two distinct 1-simplices3. A particularly important mesh-
shrinking subdivision in this work is the barycentric subdivision.
Formally, the barycentric subdivision of σ is a simplicial complex Bary σ whose vertices are
faces of σ, and whose simplices are chains of distinct faces totally ordered by containment. Every
m-simplex τ ∈ Bary σ might be written as {σ0, . . . , σm}, where σ0 ⊂ · · · ⊂ σm ⊆ σ. See Fig. 2.
Figure 2: Barycentric subdivision of σ = {v0, v1, v2}, and one of its simplices
{{v0}, {v0, v1}, {v0, v1, v2}}.
Given any continuous map, a simplicial approximation is, intuitively speaking, a “sufficiently
close” combinatorial counterpart. In accordance with [22, 17], we give a formal definition:
Definition 5.1. A simplicial map µ : K → L is a simplicial approximation of Φc : |K| → |L| if
Φc(| Intσ|) ⊆
⋂
v∈σ
|Ostµ(v)| = |Ostµ(σ)|, for all σ ∈ K.
Theorem 5.2. (Simplicial Approximation, [22, 17]) For any continuous map Φc : |K| → |L|, consider
an arbitrary mesh-shrinking subdivision operator Div. Then, there exists an N > 0 such that Φc
has a simplicial approximation
µ : DivN K → L.
5.3 Connectivity
We say that a simplicial complex K is x-connected if every continuous map of a x-sphere in |K|
can be extended into the continuous map of a (x+ 1)-disk in |K|. In analogy, think of a pencil as a
3 Intuitively, we are “shrinking” the simplices.
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1-disk, and its extremes as a 0-sphere; a coin as a 2-disk, and its border as a 1-sphere; a billiard ball
as a 3-disk, and its outer layer as a 2-sphere. In addition, (−1)-connected is defined as non-empty.
Fact 5.3. [22, 17] For any k-simplex σ, the boundary of σ is homeomorphic to a (k − 1)-sphere,
and σ is homeomorphic to a k-disk.
5.4 Protocols and Complexes
We abstract protocols as continuous exchanges of internal states, in a full-information fashion
([14] and Sec. 2). We will also use simplicial complexes to model protocol executions. Given
a model for communication and failures, we can define a protocol complex P(I) for any task
(I,O,∆). A vertex in v ∈ P(I) is a tuple with a non-faulty process identifier and its final state. A
simplex σ = {(Q1, s1), . . . , (Qx, sx)} in P(I) indicates that, in some execution, non-faulty processes
Q1, . . . , Qx finish with states s1, . . . , sx, respectively. The formal definition of protocol is identical
to [13], here presented for completeness:
Definition 5.4. A protocol for (I,O,∆) is a carrier map P that takes σ ∈ I to a protocol complex
that we denote by P(σ) ⊆ P(I).
Definition 5.5. A protocol P solves (I,O,∆) if there exists a simplicial map δ : P(I)→ O carried
by ∆.
5.5 Solvability for Colorless Tasks
In this section, we explore our colorless model and the concepts above to obtain computability
conditions specific to colorless tasks. We start with an interesting consequence of having an asyn-
chronous Byzantine protocol.
Theorem 5.6. If a colorless (I∗,O∗,∆∗) has a t-resilient protocol in asynchronous Byzantine sys-
tems, there exists a continuous map f : | skelt(I∗)| → |O∗| carried by ∆∗.
Proof. Assuming a protocol, we argue by reduction to the crash-failure case, and then proceeding
similarly to [12]. First, note that any t-resilient Byzantine protocol is also a t-resilient crash-
failure protocol. From [11, 14]4, for any σ ∈ I∗, the protocol complex P(σ) is (t − 1)-connected
in the crash-failure model, so, in light of the previous observation, it is also (t − 1)-connected in
the Byzantine-failure model, with processes failing by crashing. This implies that skelx(P(σ)) is
(x− 1)-connected for 0 ≤ x ≤ t. We will then inductively construct a sequence of continuous maps
gx : | skelx(I∗)| → |P(skelx(I∗))|, for 0 ≤ x ≤ t, mapping skeletons of I∗ to skeletons of P(I∗) as
in [12].
Base. Let g0 map any vertex v ∈ σ to any vertex v′ ∈ P(v), which exists because skel0(P(v))
is (−1)-connected by hypothesis. We just constructed
g0 : | skel0(I∗)| → |P(skel0(I∗))|.
Induction Hypothesis. Assume
gx−1 : | skelx−1(I∗)| → |P(skelx−1(I∗))|,
4 These papers characterize connectivity in terms of the minimum core size c, as defined by Junqueira and Marzullo
[16]. For t-resilient tasks in the crash-failure model, t = c + 1.
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with x ≤ t, sending the geometrical boundary of a x-simplex σx in skelx(I∗) to |P(skelx−1(σx))|.
In other words, we have gx−1(| ∂ σx|) ⊆ |P(skelx−1(σx))|. By hypothesis, P(σx) is x-connected, so
the continuous image of the (x − 1)-sphere | ∂ σx| could be extended to a continuous x-disk |σx|,
defining gx such that gx(|σx|) ⊆ |P(skelx(I∗))|. As all such maps agree on their intersections, we
just constructed
gx : | skelx(I∗)| → |P(skelx(I∗))| ⊆ |P(I∗)|.
As we assumed a protocol solving (I∗,O∗,∆∗), we have a simplicial map δ∗ : P(I∗) → O∗
carried by ∆∗ (given by Definition 5.5). Our map is induced by the composition δ∗ ◦gt. For details,
on the induced composition, please refer to [22, 17].
Colorless tasks have varying requirements in terms of the number of processes required for
solvability. Consider strict (t + 1)-set agreement. If dim(I∗) ≤ t (which includes the case when
dim(I∗) = 0), each process can simply decide on its input, without any communication. For non-
trivial cases, the protocol requires n+ 1 > t(dim(I∗) + 2), shown in Lemma 5.7. The result follows
as an application of our Equivalence Theorem (Theorem 4.11).
Lemma 5.7. The strict (t+ 1)-set agreement task
T = (I∗,O∗, skelt),
has a t-resilient protocol in asynchronous Byzantine systems if and only if n+ 1 > t(dim(I∗) + 2)
or dim(I∗) ≤ t.
Proof. (⇐) If dim(I∗) ≤ t, a k-set agreement protocol is trivial, as non-faulty processes already start
with at most t+1 distinct values in I∗. Otherwise, in the situation where (n+1)−t > t(dim(I∗)+1),
consider Alg. 2. Assuming for contradiction that each of the dim(I∗) + 1 input values is chosen by
at most t different non-faulty processes, we would have that (n+1)− t ≤ t(dim(I∗)+1). Therefore,
at least t + 1 non-faulty processes in fact input an identical value v, and non-faulty processes can
wait for such occurrence, eventually deciding on a value inside I∗. Also, as (n + 1) − t messages
are received via reliable broadcast, at most t values are missed, so at most t+ 1 values are decided,
solving the problem.
Algorithm 2 Pi.KSetStrictAgree(Ii)
1: if dim(I∗) ≤ t then return Ii
2: Get (n + 1) − t messages with values in I∗ via reliable broadcast, with some value appearing
t+ 1 times
3: return Oi = the smallest value received
(⇒) If T is solvable, then T ′ = (σ∗, σ∗, skelt) is similarly solvable, taking an arbitrary d-simplex
σ∗ = {v0, . . . , vd} in I∗ with d = dim(I∗). By our equivalence theorem, and considering the
relations in (3) and (4), we must be able to solve
T ′′ = (Ψ(σ∗;P),Ψ(σ∗;P), s˜kelt), (5)
where, for any canonical name-labeled σ, τ ∈ Ψ(σ∗;P):
τ ∈ s˜kelt(σ)⇔ ∀ canonical σ′ ⊆ σ, ∃ matching τ ′ ⊆ τ
with views(τ ′) ∈ skelt(views(σ′)). (6)
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Assume a protocol for T ′′, and for contradiction, assume that (n + 1) − t ≤ t(dim(I∗) + 1).
Consider an execution where: (i) all processes behave correctly or crash; (ii) all processes in S =
{P0, . . . , Pn−t} terminate without receiving any message from any process in T = {Pn+1−t, . . . , Pn};
(iii) each process Pi ∈ S starts with input Ii = vi mod d+1. In this case, define
Sx = {p ∈ S : p has input vx}. (7)
Note that (n + 1) − t ≥ d + 1, as I∗ contains only inputs chosen by non-faulty processes and
d = dim(I∗) by assumption. Consequently, since (d+ 1) ≤ n+ 1− t ≤ t(d+ 1), and in light of (7),
0 < |Sx| ≤ t for all 0 ≤ x ≤ d.
Regarding notation, we define σx = {(Pi, Ii) : Pi ∈ Sx} and σ−x = {(Pi, Ii) : Pi ∈ S\Sx}, concerning
the inputs; also τx = {(Pi, Oi) : Pi ∈ Sx} and τ−x = {(Pi, Oi) : Pi ∈ S\Sx}, concerning the outputs.
In order to satisfy s˜kelt, given that all processes in S decide, and that the values of the processes
in T are unknown, we must have:
views(τ−x) ∈ skelt(views(σ−x)) = skelt(σ∗ − {vx}).
Therefore,
views(τx) ⊆
⋂
y 6=x
skelt(views(σ−y))
=
⋂
y 6=x
skelt(σ∗ − {vy})
⊆ {vx},
for any 0 ≤ x ≤ n − t. In conclusion, each process decides its own input, and the decision fails
to solve the problem unless d + 1 ≤ t + 1, which implies dim(I) ≤ t. In the latter situation, the
protocol is trivial: each process can choose its own input without any communication.
The previous requirement on the number of processes, although not a necessary condition for
the solvability of all colorless tasks, is part of an interesting sufficient condition for solvability. We
shall consider the interesting cases where dim(I∗) > 0.
Theorem 5.8. For any colorless T = (I∗,O∗,∆∗), if
1. n+ 1 > t(dim(I∗) + 2); and
2. there exists a continuous map f : | skelt(I∗)| → |O∗| carried by ∆∗,
then we have a t-resilient protocol in asynchronous Byzantine systems for T .
Proof. By the simplicial approximation theorem [22, 17] (see Theorem 5.2), f has a simplicial
approximation
φ : BaryN skelt(I∗)→ O∗,
for some N > 0, also carried by ∆∗. The Byzantine-failure protocol for non-faulty processes is
shown below, presuming that n+ 1 > t(dim(I∗) + 2) with dim(I∗) > 0.
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1. Execute the Byzantine strict (t+ 1)-set agreement protocol (Algorithm 2), choosing vertices
on a simplex in skelt(I∗).
2. ExecuteN times the Byzantine barycentric agreement protocol, choosing vertices on a simplex
in
BaryN skelt(I∗).
For simplicity of presentation, we assume the approach described in Appendix B, based
on [21].
3. Apply φ : BaryN skelt(I∗)→ O∗ to choose vertices on a simplex in O∗.
As φ and f are carried by ∆∗, non-faulty processes starting on vertices of σI ∈ I∗ finish on vertices
of σO ∈ ∆∗(σ). Furthermore, since 1 ≤ dim(σI) ≤ dim(I∗), by definition, the preconditions are
satisfied for calling the protocols in steps (1) and (2).
6 Conclusion
In this work, we give novel necessary and sufficient conditions for task solvability in asynchronous
Byzantine systems. While analogous results have long existed for crash-failure systems [15], we
provide solvability conditions for arbitrary Byzantine tasks for the first time. Here, we presume an
adversarial model to specify which processes are Byzantine. Independently of which processes are
deemed faulty, any final configuration of the non-faulty processes must be permitted in respect to
the initial configuration of the non-faulty processes, according to a formal task specification.
For Byzantine colorless tasks, a specialized, more fitting model permits us to express slightly
more specific conditions for solvability. In particular, we show that the strict k-set agreement
requires a certain number of processes, except in trivial cases. Furthermore, we show that a
colorless Byzantine protocol under asynchronous systems implies the existence of a continuous map
f : | skelt I∗| → |O∗| carried by the carrier map ∆∗, and that n+ 1 > t(dim(I∗) + 2) is enough to
solve an arbitrary colorless task when such map indeed exists.
In this work, we demonstrate how the language and techniques of combinatorial topology can
produce novel results in distributed computing, facilitating existential arguments while avoiding
complicated, model-specific argumentation. As future work, we intend to explore other require-
ments for solvability in colorless tasks, specifically in regard to the number of processes, perhaps
unifying Theorems 5.6 and 5.8.
We thank Petr Kuznetsov, Zohir Bouzid, and Eli Gafni for comments on previous versions of
this work.
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A Reliable Broadcast Protocol
Algorithms 3 to 5 show the reliable broadcast protocol for sender P , round r, and content c. The
symbol “·” represents a wildcard, matching any value. For proofs and details, please refer to [2, 5, 4].
Algorithm 3 P.RBSend((P, r, c))
send(P, r, c) to all processes
Algorithm 4 P.RBEcho()
upon recv(Q, r, c) from Q do
if never sent (P,Qr{echo}, ·) then
send(P,Qr{echo}, c) to all processes
upon recv(·, Qr{echo}, c) from ≥ n+ 1− t processes do
if never sent (P,Qr{ready}, ·) then
send(P,Qr{ready}, c) to all processes
upon recv(·, Qr{ready}, c) from ≥ t+ 1 processes do
if never sent (P,Qr{ready}, ·) then
send(P,Qr{ready}, c) to all processes
Algorithm 5 P.RBRecv((Q, r, c))
recv(·, Qr{ready}, c) from (n+ 1)− t processes
return (Q, r, c)
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B Barycentric Agreement via Approximate Agreement
In this section, we show how to transform a protocol for the multidimensional -approximate agree-
ment problem, defined in [21], into barycentric agreement.
The multidimensional -approximate agreement task is defined as follows. Consider a set of
n+ 1 processes, including no more than t Byzantine processes. Every process Pi ∈ G has an input
Ii ∈ Rm and an output Oi ∈ Rm. After we run the protocol, we require:
Agreement: for any non-faulty processes Pi and Pj , the Euclidean distance between their outputs
Oi and Oj is ≤ , an error tolerance fixed a priori.
Convexity: for any non-faulty process Pi, its output Oi is in the convex hull of the inputs of the
non-faulty processes.
The point-set occupied by I is compact, and the open stars of the vertices of Bary I form an
open cover of I. Any such cover has a Lebesgue number λ > 0 [22], such that every set of diameter
less than λ is contained in some member of the cover.
We now describe a Byzantine barycentric agreement protocol. Suppose the non-faulty processes
start at the vertices of an input simplex σ. Using (λ/2)-approximate agreement, each non-faulty
process pi chooses a point inside σ, the convex hull of the inputs, such that the distance between
any pair of points is less than λ/2. Equivalently, each open ball of radius λ/2 around vi contains
all values chosen by the approximate agreement protocol. Because the diameter of this set is less
than the Lebesgue number λ, there is at least one vertex ui in Bary I such that B(vi, λ/2) lies in
the open star around ui. Let each Pi choose any such ui.
We must still show that the vertices ui that were chosen by the processes Pi lie on a single
simplex of Bary σ. Note that ui, uj are vertices of a common simplex if and only if the open star
around ui intersects the open star around uj . By construction, vj ∈ B(vi, λ/2), which is in the open
star around ui, and vj is in the open star around uj , hence ui, uj are vertices of a single simplex.
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